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Abstract: In both economically developed and developing countries, privatisation, budget austerity 
measures and market liberalisations have become key aspects of structural reform programs in the last 
three decades. These three recommended policies were parts of strong revival of classical and new-
classical school of thought since the middle of 70s. Such programs aim to achieve higher microeconomic 
efficiency and foster economic growth, whilst also aspiring to reduce public sector borrowing 
requirements through the elimination of unnecessary subsidies. For firms to achieve superior 
performance a change in ownership from public (state ownership) to private has been recommended as a 
vital condition. To assess the ownership role, the economic performances of private, public and mixed 
enterprises in Finland is compared through the use of factor analysis method. The extracted factors, using 
data of two years, 1998 and 2000, do not pick ownership as a key performance factor.   
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1. Introduction  
 
Both developed and developing countries have progressively engaged in ambitious privatisation 
programs for several decades. Over the years, the number of privatisation transactions has grown. From 
2000 to 2007, the sale of state-owned assets reached $497.7 billion in OECD countries. To illustrate the 
relevance of this policy, table 1 shows how the change in European state-owned enterprises shares in 
GDP for the year 2006, and is grouped with income level in accordance with the OECD’s classification.  
 
Table 1: Privatisation Top-10: OECD countries from 2000 to 2007 
Largest absolute amounts  Largest relative to size of domestic economy 
Country  Amount (US$ bn.)  Country  Per cent of 2006 GDP  
France  98.2  Slovak Republic  13.5  
Finland  69.6  Czech Republic  9.2  
Germany  65.0  Finland  8.7  
Japan  33.2  Iceland  8.6  
Turkey  25.0  Hungary  6.9  
Netherlands  23.1  Greece  4.8  
Australia  20.0  Turkey  4.7  
United Kingdom  18.4  Portugal  4.4  
Finland  18.3  France  4.4  
Sweden  16.0  Poland  4.3  
Total OECD  497.7  Total OECD  1.4  
Sources: Privatization Barometer, where available; country questionnaire responses and, in the case of 
Iceland, press reports. 
 
The change does not only respond to privatisation strategies, but is also strongly linked to them. It 
reflects the declining role of the public sector as owner of productive assets in the economy. A study such 
as this is important for many reasons. Firstly, enhancing efficiency and performance of the public sector 
has been the key objective of reforms in many countries, including Finland. Whether or not the objective 
of higher efficiency with respect to privatized firms has been reached in Finland is a matter of 
investigation. Secondly, the policymakers, stakeholders, and researchers would be interested in knowing 
the effect of such a dilution on performance and efficiency. And most importantly, still a lot of studies 
need to be carried out to know the role of ownership in enhancing the performance of an enterprise. 
Lastly, as the empirical studies indicate in several countries, post privatization outcomes are mixed, some 
indicate positive and some negative results. It would be desirable to assess the privatisation outcomes in 
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a country like Finland, which has followed other European countries implementing the economic reform 
of privatisation. Microeconomic theory suggests that incentive and contracting problems create 
inefficiencies as a result of public ownership; provided that managers of state-owned enterprises pursue 
objectives that differ from those of private firms (political view) and are less monitored (management 
view). Objectives are distorted, as well as faced with softened budget constraints because bankruptcy is 
not a plausible threat to public managers and gives rise to soft-budget constraint. As a preventative 
measure of financial distress, it is thus in the central government’s own interest to bail public managers 
out in times of financial distress. Theoretical implications are confirmed by numbers of empirical 
evidences (there are, however, some empirical evidences, which show opposite results), in the sense that 
changing ownership through privatisation raises profitability and efficiency in both competitive and 
monopolistic sectors. 
 
Public ownership in Finland has had a dominated position in infrastructure industries and public 
services, beside the fact that it has been present in manufacturing and banking as well. State-ownership 
accounted for 18-22% of industrial value added, 12-15% of industrial employment and 23-30% of the 
export, before the start of the privatisation programme. The government tried to categorize public 
enterprises into three groups. The first group is associated with wider objectives (’special assignments’) 
and will remain in public control, despite some partial privatisation. Energy, air transport and the retail 
trade of alcohol have special assignments, like broadcasting, lotteries and football pools. The second 
group, which includes chemicals and basic metals and associated technology, is seen as being of strategic 
importance. The state will remain a shareholder, but ownership may be reduced below 50%. The third 
group, which includes paper, metal engineering, and banking, consists of investment objects that may be 
privatised if necessary. The sale of state-enterprises appeared on the agenda through a government 
blueprint in 1991, when the left was still in government. Next right-wing government was in favour of 
privatisation, but was prevented until 1994 because of the recession. Some state-owned companies were 
sold before the 90s, as part of a pragmatic policy at that time. But the privatisations from 1994 onwards 
signify a policy shift. The set objectives for privatisation programs in different countries to achieve are far 
broader, and fundamentally involve the improvement of microeconomic efficiency. Generally, there are 
four explicit objectives in such programs.  
 To attain higher efficiency in terms of allocation and productivity; 
 To create a stronger role for the private sector within the economy; 
 To advance the financial health of the public sector; and 
 To liberate resources for allocation in other essential areas of activity within the government 
(normally associated with social policy).  
 
Privatisation programs should, consequently, be considered by looking at the level at which the stated 
aims have been reached, on one hand, and what role the ownership has played to reach all the above 
goals, on the other hand. Theoretical arguments behind the view that privatisation can attain these aims 
as well as surveys of the empirical literature are reviewed. The purpose of this article is to investigate 
whether ownership has been a significant characteristic of enterprise performance in Finland. This 
attempt is part of a broader investigation series, which is being conducted to discover the characteristics 
of ownership with regards to enterprise performance. In this article, the performance of three differently 
owned companies, state, private and mixed, will be considered and factor analysis methodology will be 
deployed. This will permit the use of quantitative and qualitative data alongside each other to extract 
common factors of these types of activities. The paper has four further sections. The second section is 
dedicated to reviewing literature; including theoretical arguments, which support the view that private 
ownership is favoured over public ownership. Specific testable inferences are proposed as guidelines to 
the empirical survey. The third section presents a viable methodological option to assess the 
characteristic of ownership in the context of enterprise performances in Finland.  The fourth section is 
devoted to analysing results. And the final section is consists of concluding remarks.  
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Theory the Managerial Perspective: Low-powered incentives, according to the ‘managerial’ 
perspective, are behind imperfect monitoring in public-owned enterprises. The managers of state-owned 
enterprises are poorly monitored because the firms are not traded in the market as they are with private 
firms. This means that the threat of take-over when the firm performs poorly is abolished. According to 
Yarrow, (1992) and Vickers and Yarrow, (1989), shareholders are unable to observe and affect the 
performance of the enterprises. Another argument, which is put forward by this perspective, is that of 
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SOE (state owned enterprises) debt actually perceived as being public debt and traded under different 
conditions. Debt markets cannot play the role of disciplining the managers of public-owned enterprises. It 
has been argued that this problem can be solved by privatisation, without having to pursue complete 
divestiture. Furthermore, managers of SOEs can increase the scale of production, since bankruptcy is a 
non-credible threat under public ownership. In contrast, for a private manager, this would be a real threat 
of failure, which could reduce productive efficiency.  
 
The Political Perspective: It is argued by the ‘political’ perspective that distortions in the aim, the 
function (Shapiro and Willig, 1990) and the constraints private managers face, through the so-called soft 
budget constraint problem (Kornai, 1980; 1986), result in lower efficiency under public ownership. 
Public managers, who have a tendency to report to politicians and pursue political careers themselves, 
incorporate objective function aspects relating to the maximisation of employment in their actions. Their 
desire to maximise their employment is at the expense of efficiency and political prestige (the empire 
building hypothesis). Managers do not face the risk of bankruptcy because of soft budget constraint.  
Wherever firms have engaged in unwise investments, it is in the central government’s interest to bail 
them out using the public budget. The rationale behind this is that the bankruptcy of a firm would be very 
costly from a political stand-point, and such burden would be distributed within well-defined political 
groups, such as unions. The cost of a bail out can instead be shared by the taxpayers, a less organised and 
larger group in society with assorted interests and preferences. This is because under public ownership, 
the threat of bankruptcy is non-credible. Thus, we can, by way of a rather simple assumption, obtain the 
soft budget constraint result as the equilibrium in the race between the public manager and the central 
government (or “ministry of finance”). This supposition is such that the political loss associated with 
closing a publicly-owned company is greater than political costs of using taxpayer money to bail it out (or 
public debt, i.e. future tax collection). 
 
Evidence: Empirical studies to evaluate the privatisation performance can be categorised into two 
groups: Microeconomic and macroeconomic evidence. More tangible conclusions can be drawn from the 
microeconomic perspective rather than from the macroeconomic one. The following case studies span 
prior to and following privatisation. They exhibit country-specific, cross-sector evidence that looks into 
performance changes of firms in different sectors within the same country, as well as cross-country 
evidence that uses data from publicly traded firms in different countries to evaluate changes in their 
financial status.  
 
Microeconomic Evidence: Some empirical evidences strongly support the view that privatisation has 
positive effects on profitability and efficiency at the microeconomic level. However, alongside these 
results, there are, at the same time, some studies, which point to opposite results. The first piece of 
evidence consists of case studies, among which Galal, et al. (1994) shows comprehensive evidence. This 
study looks at the performance of twelve privatised firms in four different countries. The methodology of 
their case study is counterfactual and makes projections of the firms’ performance fall under the 
privatisation scenario and a hypothetical “public ownership scenario”. Changes in welfare are measured 
by way of a comparison between these two scenarios. In four cases, consumer welfare has increased; in 
five of them it has decreased, and it has remained unaltered in the rest. In nine cases, the government has 
a net gain, and the firm’s buyers gained in all of them. Through the partial equilibrium nature of this 
analysis, a distinctly positive effect of privatisation on total welfare is shown by these firm studies. The 
second type of study focuses on one specific country and analyses evidence across industries. LaPorta and 
López-De-Silanes (1998) analyse the performance of 218 enterprises in Mexico in 26 different sectors 
between 1983 and 1991. An essential aspect of this work is the authors’ decomposition of the changes in 
profitability into price increases, labour reduction and productivity gains. Two common criticisms of 
privatisation are addressed by their analysis. The first is that at the expense of society, through charging 
higher prices, the profitability of firms has increased. The second is that firms have made profits at the 
expense of workers, whose labour contracts are less generous and involve significant layoffs.  Results 
indicate that profitability, measured through the ratio of operating income to sales, rose by 24 percentage 
points. However, such gains are decomposed into the following components: i) an increase in price 
constitutes 10% of the results; ii) laid-off workers constitute 33%; iii) productivity gains constitute 57%. 
A regression analysis is also carried out to identify the role of market power and deregulation in 
determining privatisation outcomes. 
 
Smith et al., (1996) study privatisation in Slovenia. They use a country-wide database with privatised 
firms from 1989 to 1992. Their objective is to analyse the effect of various types of ownership on 
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performance. The results indicate a visibly positive effect of privatisation on ownership performances. 
Foreign ownership, for example, has shown an outstandingly positive effect on the performance when it 
comes to distinguishing the effects of different types of ownership. However, it appears that employee-
owned firms have performed relatively better than those owned through foreign investment. Gupta et.al 
(2008) examines the consequences of privatisation program in the Czech Republic. They used data of the 
year 1992 at the firm-level for firms with 25 or more workers. The results they found show that 
privatised firms are among more profitable firms. However, for the government of the Czech Republic the 
main objective was to maximizing government revenues through selling public assets. Mestiri (2010) 
investigates the impact of privatization on the Tunisian government owned airline, Tunisair, over the 
period of 1976-2007.  20 % of the capital of the Tunisair was privatized by the government using the 
initial public offering method in July 1995. The author used data envelopment analysis to evaluate the 
efficiency of Tunisair privatization. After privatization Tunisair has experienced a better economic 
efficiency, as its technical efficiency scores have increased from 0.743 to scores close to 1. Cross country 
evidence starts with a very important study by Megginson et al (1994).  They analyse pre and post 
privatisation performance of 61 companies from 18 countries and 32 industries, which were privatised 
between 1961 and 1990 through public offerings. D’Souza and Megginson (1998) carry out the same type 
of study by using 78 companies from 25 countries, including 10 LCDs that faced privatisation during 1990 
to 1994 through public offering. Their sample includes 14 banks, 21 utility and 10 telecommunication 
companies. Bourbakri and Cosset (1998) use data of 79 companies from 21 developing countries. These 
firms were privatised between 1980 and 1992 through public offerings.  
 
Claessens and Djankov (1998) use the largest data set, consisting of 6.300 manufacturing firms in seven 
Central and Eastern European countries, namely Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, 
Slovak Republic and Slovenia. The performance indicators are analysed by presenting mean and median 
levels of profitability, sales, operating efficiency, leverage, capital expenditures and employment. There 
are, in most cases, controls for whether the markets are competitive; regulated or unregulated, as well as 
controls for partial versus full privatisation. The evidence is robustly in favour of the better performance 
of firms after privatisation. Profitability has largely increased with varying specifications, periods of time 
and groups of countries. Interestingly enough, in both Bourbakri and Cosset (1998) and D’Souza and 
Megginson (1998), profitability increased more than operating efficiency in regulated (or non-
competitive) industries. Thus, higher profitability does not necessary imply higher efficiency, and the 
market structure links both concepts. The idea that a certain degree of market power is being exploited 
by firms is also supported by the evidence. In all cases, capital expenditure (investment) systematically 
increased, reflecting both growth and the post-sale restructuring which took place. Employment 
increased in all cases, including those of developing countries. It seems that this evidence on employment 
is inconsistent with that in, for example, LaPorta and López-De-Silanes (1998) work. There are two 
justifications for such inconsistency. Firstly, a non-negligible selection bias is generated. The cross-
country studies analysed by the authors use only data from firms that were sold via public offerings. Such 
firms are the ones expected to have higher potential for profitability. Secondly, the author’s country-
specific study incorporates data from three years prior to the privatisation of all firms. This potentially 
eliminates labour redundancy prior to sales. Fully privatised firms perform better than partially 
privatised ones in all of the cases.  
 
Frydman et al (1997) reported improvement in corporate performance that was consistent with the 
results shown above, in the case of transition economies. Robustly positive performance alterations in a 
large sample of firms in Central and Eastern Europe were reported by Frydman et al (1998) and 
Claessens and Djankov (1998). They were interested in testing the political view, i.e. whether the 
withdrawal of political intervention provides an explanation for the positive results. The former paper 
found outstanding improvements in total factor productivity and a decline in excess employment in firms 
without state intervention. It controlled for institutional differences and the endogenity of privatisation 
choices. The latter paper found evidence that entrepreneurial behaviour drives the efficiency gains on 
removal of state intervention. The authors conclude that the performance results of privatised companies 
are the features of a greater willingness to comprehend risks and a liberty to make decisions without 
state intervention. Brawn, et. al. (2005) analyse the effects of privatization on state owned manufacturing 
firms in Hungary, Russia, Romania, and Ukraine. They use time series data of annual observations to 
compare both before and after privatization performance. They used longitudinal econometric methods 
to obtain comparable estimates across countries. The result shows a substantially positive effect of 
privatization on productivity in Romania and Hungry. Moreover, the estimated effects for Romania are 
significantly bigger than for Hungary.  The estimated effects in Ukraine are positive, but lower than 
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Romania and Hungary. Contrary to these countries, the estimated effects are negative for the last county, 
Russia. 
 
Macroeconomic Evidence: There is no certain evidence of the effects of privatisation at the 
macroeconomic level. However, it is possible to provide an overview of the patterns observed in key 
aggregate variables and structural reform measures were also put in place to some extent in most 
countries. These policy measures include, amongst others, trade liberalisation, fiscal adjustment, tax 
reform and weakening of controls to capital inflows. Whilst it is impossible to attribute observed trends 
to one isolated policy, we can argue, on the basis of theoretical arguments, that macroeconomic trends are 
connected. Evidence supporting the claim that privatisation reduces the burden on public financing is 
shown in the aforementioned studies. Following reform, both low and middle income countries have, on 
average, succeeded in eliminating net subsidies to public enterprises. SOEs display a surplus in their 
operation as far as middle income countries are concerned. This can result from reforms in management 
and the introduction of competition, as well as the concept of “best” firms being those which have 
remained in the hands of the government. For example, oil companies and natural monopolies like 
electric utilities. Reforms are being considered in countries where the trend in fiscal deficit is still largely 
negative. There, the most favourable trend is that of the deficit in upper middle income economies – 
where the most aggressive reformers can be found, such as Argentina, Chile, Mexico and Malaysia. A 
central effect observed in all income groups is that of financial sector development (see Demirguc and 
Levine (1994) and McLindon (1996)). For both low and middle income economies, reforms have had an 
impact on that indicator of capital market development; whereas, in high income countries, capitalisation 
of the stock market has remained stable. All such economies show a positive trend. Upper middle income 
countries have reached levels of capitalisation similar to those in high income economies (approximately 
55% of GDP). The low-income group is approximately 16% and lower middle income economies are 
roughly 25%. 
 
This mobilisation of resources and consistency of reforms has subsequently attracted more direct 
investment by foreigners. Middle income countries show a positive trend in foreign direct investment; 
whereas, low-income countries, in which reforms and privatisation have been more aggressive, show a 
significant increase of such investment in later years. Lastly, in terms of GDP growth, the pattern is rather 
stable across income groups with no clear trend. However, in low and lower middle income economies, 
variability is larger. Conversely, unemployment shows a rather irregular pattern across countries. 
Aggressive, late and less aggressive reformers illustrate an increase in the unemployment rate. Argentina 
and Poland are examples of aggressive reformers, where the unemployment rate rose by 9 and 8 
percentage points, respectively, between 1990 and 1996. France and Hungary are amongst the late and 
less aggressive reformers, where unemployment grew 3.5 and 3%, respectively, throughout the same 
period. In terms of privatisation, it is not possible to draw any conclusions on the overall unemployment 
rate. In recent years, unemployment has shown a rising trend in most countries around the world (see 
Demirguc and Levine (1994) and McLindon (1996)). As theoretical stand points support the policy 
adjustment of selling the government owned enterprises to private buyers and argue that the 
implementation of policy would lead to higher economic efficiencies of privatised firms, better allocations 
of resources and consumers benefits, the empirical studies show mixed results. Some studies indicate 
very higher economic and financial achievements from the policy reform namely privatisation and some 
show negative results.   
 
3. Methodology  
 
In general there are two main approaches to evaluate the impact of privatisation on enterprise 
performance: the ‘synchronic’ approach and the ‘historical’ one (Frydman et al., 1997). The synchronic 
approach is based on a comparison of performance of state and private (or privatised) enterprises. La 
Porta & Lopezde-Silanes (1997), for example, have used this approach in their study. The synchronic 
approach compares firms’ performances under the same conditions: at the same time, in the same 
markets, within the same environment. Nevertheless, it is practically impossible to find two identical 
enterprises especially if one of the two should be a state-owned enterprise and the other a private one. 
There are always differences in capacity, equipment or supply; every enterprise operates in its own 
economic, political and social environment, and every enterprise is at its own stage of the life cycle. The 
second approach, the historical approach, compares the ex-ante and ex-post privatisation performance of 
the same enterprise. The approach was used, for example, by Megginson et al. (1994). This approach is 
too straightforward. It permits only measurement of enterprise performance changes after privatisation. 
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However, it fails to isolate the privatisation benefits from the impact of other factors that have also 
influenced the performance results. A reliable study of the impact of privatisation on performance, as 
Frydman et al. (1997) argue, can be a combination of these two approaches. Empirical studies aiming to 
assess the privatisation performance using one of these two approaches or a mixture of both are carried 
out through the use of different methodologies.  
 
The methodologies used to assess enterprise performance and the roles of ownership include: total factor 
productivity, factor analysis, cost benefit analysis and ratio analysis. Among these methods, factor 
analysis may be more useful than the others as our aim is to incorporate quantitative and qualitative 
variables alongside each other. This technique can be used to measure comparative enterprise 
performance and the subsequent role of ownership in output results from the Statistical Package for 
Social Sciences (SPSS). Factor analysis is a mathematical tool which can be used to examine a wide range 
of data sets. It has been used in disciplines as diverse as economics, chemistry, sociology and psychology 
because of its ability to analyse the performance of a variety of different aspects. The main functions of 
factor analytic techniques can be summarised as follows: (1) to reduce the number of variables and (2) to 
detect structure in the relationships between variables, that is to classify variables. Therefore, factor 
analysis is applied as a data reduction or structure detection method. The term factor analysis was first 
introduced by Thurstone in 1931. Many statistical methods can be used to study the relation between 
independent and dependent variables. However, the factor analysis approach is unique in that it studies 
patterns to discover the relationship among many dependent variables. Its goal is to discover something 
about the nature of the independent variables that affect dependent variables; without measuring those 
independent variables. Consequently, when independent variables are observed directly, answers 
obtained by factor analysis are hypothetical and tentative. The conditional independent variables are 
called factors. A typical factor analysis advocates answers to four major questions:  
 
 How many different factors are needed to explain the pattern of relationships among these variables?  
 What is the nature of those factors?  
 How well do the hypothesized factors explain the observed data?  
 How much purely random or unique variance does each observed variable include? 
 
Factor analysis needs a set of data points in matrix form. The terms 'row designee' and 'column designee' 
are referred to the row and column identifiers of the matrix. This terminology is used because of the very 
wide range of data matrix types that may be analyzed by factor analysis. To carry out this method the data 
must be bi-linear. Therefore, the row entities and the column entities must be independent of each other. 
Factor analysis comprises of both component analysis and common factor analysis. The purpose is to 
discover simple patterns in the pattern of relationships among the variables. Above all, it seeks to 
discover if the observed variables can be explained largely or entirely in terms of a much smaller number 
of variables called factors. 
 
Factor Analysis Method: This method can be used to identify whether a number of variables of interest 
Y1, Y2, ..., Yl, are linearly related to a smaller number of unobservable factors F1, F2, ..., Fk.  Factors are 
observed in factor analysis; whereas, in other methods such as regression analysis they are not. The 
hypothesized factor model under certain conditions has certain implications. These implications in turn 
can be tested against the observations. To explain this method three variables, Y1, Y2, and Y3, and three 
factors have been extracted. It is assumed that each Y variable is linearly related to the two factors, as 
follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
The error terms e1, e2, and e3, demonstrate that the hypothesized relationships are not exact. The 
parameters  are referred to as loadings. For example,   is called the loading of variable Y1 on 
factor F2. It is expected that the loadings have roughly the following structure if, for example, Y1 is 
assumed to be a quantitative variable and Y2 and Y3 are two qualitative variables: 
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Variable, Yi                     F1, F2,  
   Y1                                                +         0 
   Y2                                                0         + 
   Y3                                                0          + 
The zeros in the preceding table are not expected to be exactly equal to zero. By `0' we mean 
approximately equal to zero and by `+' a positive number substantially different from zero.  
 
From the above equations it may be observed that the loadings can be estimated and the expectations 
tested by regressing each Y against the two factors. However, this is not feasible as the factors cannot be 
observed. An entirely new strategy is required.  The simplest model of factor analysis is based on two 
assumptions.  
A1: The error terms ei are independent of one another, and such that  
E(ei) = 0 and Var (ei) = . 
A2: The unobservable factors Fi are independent of one another and of the error terms, and are such that  
E(Fj) = 0 and Var(Fj) =1. 
 
In more advanced models, the condition that the factors are independent can be relaxed. As for the factor 
means and variances, the assumption is that the factors are standardized. It is an assumption made for 
mathematical convenience; since the factors are not observable, we might as well think of them as 
measured in standardized form. To examine the implications of these assumptions let each observable 
variable be a linear function of independent factors and error terms, and be written as 
 
 
 
The variance of Yi can be calculated as follows: 
 
  
 
The variance of Yi consists of two parts: 
 
 
 
 
The first, the communality of the variable, is the part that is explained by the common factors F1 and F2. 
The second, the specific variance, is the part of the variance of Yi that is not accounted for by the common 
factors. If the two factors were perfect predictors of grades, then  
 
e1 = e2 = e3 = 0 always, and  
 
To calculate the covariance of any two observable variables, Yi and Yj, we can write 
 
 
 
Var ( ) + ) + (0) (1) 
Var (  
+  
 
All the variances and co-variances can be shown on the following table: 
 
Variable                   Y1                                   Y2                                     Y3  
     Y1   
     Y2   
      Y3   
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The variances of the Y variables are in the diagonal cells of the table and the co-variances of the Y 
variables are in the horizontal cells of the table. This table is called the theoretical variance co-variance 
matrix. The matrix is symmetric, in the sense that the entry in row 1 and column 2 is the same as that in 
row 2 and column 1, and so on. If observations on the Variables Y1, Y2, and Y3 are given, the observed 
variances and co-variances of those variables can be calculated and arranged in an observed variance co-
variance matrix as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thus,  is the observed variance of Y1, S12 the observed co-variance of Y1 and Y2, and so on. As the S12 = 
S21, S13 = S31, and so on; the matrix, in other words, is symmetric. Since we have the observed variances 
and co-variances of the variables, and the variances and co-variances implied by the factor model, and 
assuming that the model's assumptions are true, the loadings  can be estimated. As a result, the final 
estimates of the theoretical variances and covariances are close to the observed ones. As far as the 
loadings are concerned, there exist an infinite number of sets of values of the  yielding with the same 
theoretical variances and co-variances. 
 
Having two models, A and B, the rotation produces the loadings of Model B as a result of applying to the 
loadings of Model A. Any other rotation of the original loadings will produce a new set of loadings with 
the same theoretical variances and co-variances as those of the original model. The number of such 
rotations is, of course, infinitely large. This is an advantage of the factor model. In particular, it is expected 
that some loadings will be close to zero, while others will be positive or negative and substantially 
different from zero. For this reason, factor analysis usually proceeds in two stages. The First Stage: One 
set of loadings   is calculated. This will yield theoretical variances and co-variances according to a 
certain criterion that fit the observed loadings as closely as possible. These loadings, however, may not 
agree with the prior expectations, or may not lend themselves to a reasonable interpretation. Thus, the 
second stage is needed. The Second Stage: The first loadings need to be “rotated”. This should be done in 
order to arrive at another set of loadings. This will fit the observed variances and co-variances. This stage 
is more consistent with prior expectations and it can be easily interpreted. In practise, the most widely 
used method for determining a first set of loadings is the principal component method. This is not, 
however, the only method for factor analysis. It is also possible to use the principal factor (also called 
principal axis) and maximum likelihood methods. The principal component method looks for values of 
the loadings that bring the estimate of the total communality as close as possible to the total of the 
observed variances, while co-variances are ignored. The table below shows the elements of the factor 
model on which the principal component method concentrates. Elements of Principal Component 
Methods 
 
Table 2: Elements of Principal Component Methods 
Variable                                Observed Variance,          Communality,   
Y1   
Y2   
Y3   
Total                                                    T0                                                   Tt  
 
The communality is the part of the variance of the variable that is explained by the factors. The larger this 
part, the more successful the postulated factor model can be said to be in explaining the variable. The 
principal component method determines the values of the , which make the total communality (Tt in 
the Table) approximate as closely as possible the sum of the observed variances of the variables. The sum 
of squared loadings on F1, , on F2, , and on F3, can be interpreted as the contribution 
of F1, F2 and F3 in explaining the sum of the observed variances. The estimate of the specific variance of a 
variable like Yi, is the difference between the observed variance and estimated communality of Yi. 
Variable 
Variable Y1 Y2 Y3 
Y1    
Y2    
Y3    
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Having the total communality approximate as closely as possible, the sum of the observed variances (in 
effect, attaching the same weight to each variable) makes sense when the Y variables are measured in the 
same units.  When this is not the case the principal component method will favour the variables with 
large variances at the expense of those with small ones. For this reason, it is routine to standardize the 
variables prior to subjecting them to the principal component method so that all have mean zero and 
variance equal to one. This can be carried out by subtracting from each observation ( ) the mean of the 
variable (¹Yi) and dividing the result by the standard deviation (Si) of the variable to obtain the 
standardized observation, , 
 
 
It can be shown that the co-variances of the standardized variables are equal to the correlation 
coefficients of the original variables (the variances of the standardized variables are, of course, equal to 
1). It can be confirmed that the means of the standardized variables are equal to 0, and their variances 
and standard deviations equal to 1. Standardization, in effect, subjects the observed correlation matrix of 
the original variables-rather than the observed variance covariance matrix| to the principal component 
method. The principal component solution for standardized variables will not necessarily be the same as 
that for non-standardized ones. In some statistical programs (e.g., SPSS, SAS), standardization and the 
principal component method are default options. These techniques, as explained above, are deployed to 
measure comparative corporate performance and the subsequent role of ownership, using output results 
from the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS). All output results involve rotation when the first 
factor solution does not reveal the hypothesized structure of the loadings. It is routine to apply rotations 
when searching for a set of loadings that fit the observations and help facilitate the interpretation of 
results. Computer programs carry out rotations satisfying certain criteria. The most widely used of these 
is the varimax criterion. Rotated loadings maximize the variance of the squared loadings for each factor. 
The objective is to make some of these loadings as large as possible, and the rest as small as possible in 
absolute value. The varimax method promotes the detection of factors to be related to few variables, not 
influenced by all variables. Alongside this the quartimax criterion tries to maximize the variance of the 
squared loadings in each variable, and tends to produce factors with high loadings for all variables. 
 
Data and Variables: Data on turnovers, profits, total assets and total number of employees for the years 
1998 and 2000 have been collected from four different sources: Major Companies of Europe, Amadeus, 
and DataStream. All data has been converted to a same-base currency, the US dollar. As Figure 1 
illustrates, it was not until 1993 that most EU countries undertook ambitious programmes, principally 
through public share offerings of public enterprises. The EU privatization during the 1990s, has a pattern 
of almost continuous growth, from US$13 billion in 1990 to US$66 billion in 1999, followed by a decline 
to US$13 billion in 2002 (Figure 1). The pattern has reached its peak point during the 1998 to 2001. We 
decided to pick up the year 1998 and 2000 as the privatisation revenue in EU has reached its highest 
level.  
 
Figure 1: Privatisation revenue in EU 
 
Source: Privatization Barometer (2005)  
 
Productivity and performance are respectively represented by variables called PROD and PROF.  The 
former variable is created through the turnover divided by the number of employees (essentially a crude 
measure of gross labour productivity). The latter variable is created through profit divided by the number 
of employees.  Since PROD and PROF can measure some aspects of performance, we will refer to them 
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together as reflecting “productivity & performance” even though this is slightly misleading. In this 
analysis, performance will be represented by PERF. We have not yet used the rate of profit as a variable; 
although we could have since it is given by PROD/PROF, which means that its constitutive elements are 
included in the empirical analysis. Ownership is treated as a categorical or nominal variable.  Nominal 
data relates to qualitative variables or attributes, such as gender or ownership, and is a record of category 
membership. Nominal data is defined by labels: it may take the form of numbers, but such numbers are 
merely arbitrary code numbers.  
 
4. Result Analysis 
 
The output from this package, however, is comprised of different elements ranging from descriptive 
statistics to the rotated component matrix – the main focus being on the principal component matrix. In 
general, the further refinement of factor analysis through for example rotation has not significantly 
enhanced or modified the results. Consequently, the principal components of factor analysis are solely 
reported here. The main purpose of this exercise is to first ascertain which variables are highly loaded 
(i.e., highly correlated to a factor) or, in other words, which extracted factors pick up which variables; and, 
second, to determine common characteristics. It is assumed that performance is a function of turnover, 
profit, total assets, productivity, performance, ownership, concentration, and total number of employees: 
Performance = f (turnover, profit, total assets [or tassets], total number of employees, productivity, 
performance, ownership and concentration). In these exercises (which compare the performance of state, 
mixed, and private companies in Finland to find the role of ownership) state companies are assigned a 
value of 0, private companies a value of 1, and mixed companies a value between 0 and 1 depending on 
the percentage of shares owned by the state.  Two years, 1998 and 2000, have been chosen for analysis, 
and annual data for these three types of companies has been collected.  The number of Finish companies 
in1998 and 2000 (state, mixed and private) is shown in the table below. 
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics For Six Mixed Companies Finland 1998 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
TURNOVER 82259 10063608 3324792 3491841 
PROFIT -4906 440142 179039 192792 
TASSETS 715320 13040599 4112434 4509247 
EMPLOYEE 29 19003 10620 6301 
OWNERS 0.4 0.71 0.54 0.1 
PROD 145.02 2836.52 706.87 1051.47 
PROF -0.35 1468.88 259.36 592.77 
 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics For Eight Mixed Companies Finland 2000 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
TURNOVER 80132 10482093 2998287 3286576 
PROFIT -10599 1730732 379857 579463 
TASSETS 430000 13797467 4180187 4724421 
EMPLOYEE 49 16220 9553 5108 
OWNERS 0.4 1 0.58 0.2 
PROD 75.56 1635.35 443.44 512.22 
PROF -2.31 699.2 120.34 240.17 
 
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics For Fifty-Six Private Companies Finland 1998 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
TURNOVER 22307 7329901 290417 991687 
PROFIT -12526 155158 9397 25404 
TASSETS 6499 2968691 187123 460998 
EMPLOYEE 12 11172 1001 2151 
OWNERS 1 1 1 0 
PROD 59.81 3631.45 474.43 712.44 
PROF -22.3 499.01 20.79 67.11 
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Table 6: Descriptive Statistics For One Hundred and Seventeen Private Companies Finland 2000 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
TURNOVER 3219 3123878 213734 442139 
PROFIT -43307 162170 9464 28949 
TASSETS 3823 3407494 182271 443929 
EMPLOYEE 28 23480 1139 2811 
OWNERS 1 1 1 0 
PROD 42.63 7295.81 316.86 695.55 
PROF -176.83 423.22 8.94 45.92 
 
 
Table 7: Descriptive Statistics For Forty-Eight State Companies Finland 1998 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
TURNOVER 3633 2716595 182538 423631 
PROFIT -18086 318480 14306 47264 
TASSETS 773 7938643 330998 1163037 
EMPLOYEE 11 9994 608 1504 
OWNERS 0 0 0 0 
PROD 52.08 12104.34 812.4 2159.67 
PROF -283.43 606.48 28.74 116.49 
 
 
Table 8: Descriptive Statistics For Seventy-Five State Companies Finland 2000 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
TURNOVER 1594 4798003 220825 631886 
PROFIT -52999 224171 14103 44722 
TASSETS 1367 9405995 316826 1157086 
EMPLOYEE 10 9373 555 1190 
OWNERS 0 0 0 0 
PROD 7.62 15327.61 712.94 1896.39 
PROF -274.61 587.42 28.64 104.96 
 
For this country data on one hundred and ten companies for the year 1998, and two hundred companies 
for the year 2000, have been collected. The descriptive statistics from the above tables show relatively 
small standard deviations in the variables OWNERS, PROD and PROF of all three types of companies for 
both years. 
 
Table 9 1998 
Variables Component 1   (Size) Component 2 (Perf) 
Turnover 0.942 -0.008 
Profit 0.908 0.084 
Total Assets 0.959 0.082 
Number of Employees 0.930 -0.072 
Ownership 0.038 -0.521 
Prod -0.079 0.715 
Prof -0.007 0.637 
Variance Extracted 50.060 17.264 
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The Year 1998: The loadings on F1 (component 1) are relatively large for Turnover, Profit, Total Assets, 
and Number of Employees, 0.942, 0.908, 0.959 and 0.930. But loadings are relatively very small for Prod 
and Prof, -0.079 and -0.007, respectively. For the Ownership the loading is very small; only 0.038. The 
loadings on F2 (component 2) are close to zero for Turnover, Profit, Total Assets, and Number of 
Employees, -0.008, 0.084, 0.082 and -0.072, respectively. But, they are relatively high for Prod and Prof, 
0.715 and 0.637, respectively. The loading for the variable Ownership is, -0.521. As with the original non-
standardized variables, Turnover, Total Assets, Number of Employees and Profit depend on one common 
factor, which can be interpreted as size. Two other variables, Prod and Prof depend on another common 
factor, which can be interpreted as performance. The last variable, Ownership, is not highly loaded with 
none of two extracted factors. F1 accounts for about 50.060%, while F2 account for about 17.264%, 
respectively of the sum of the observed variances. The two factors together explain 67.324% of the sum 
of the observed variances of the standardized variables, less than with the original variables. 
 
The Year 2000: The loadings on F1 (component 1) are relatively large for Turnover, Profit, Total Assets 
and Number of Employee 0.934, 0.780, 0.942 and 0.835, respectively. For Prod and Prof the loadings are 
very small, 0.007 and 0.137, respectively. It is very small for Ownership; only -0.013. The loadings on F2 
(component 2) are very small for Turnover, Profit, Total Assets and Number of Employees -0.041, 0.080, -
0.004 and -0.169, respectively. But they are relatively high for Prod and Prof, 0.811 and 0.797, 
respectively. For Ownership the loading is not significant; only -0.441. Two factors-as in the previous 
year-were identified by the program. The first factor had high loadings for Turnover, Profit, Total Assets 
and Number of Employees. It could be interpreted as the size of the enterprise. The second factor had 
high loadings for Prod and Prof and could be interpreted as the performance of the enterprise. The last 
variable, Ownership, was not heavily loaded with the first and second extracted factors.   F1 accounted for 
about 44.062%, while F2 accounted for about 21.766%, respectively of the sum of the observed 
variances. The two factors together explained 65.828% of the sum of the observed variances of the 
standardized variables, less than with the original variables. In the preceding illustration, the number of 
factors and their nature were hypothesized in advance. It was reasonable to assume that size and 
performance were two factors influencing enterprise performances. In the metropolitan area where the 
data was selected, the ownership of enterprises is presumably unrelated to the size and performance of 
the enterprises in Finland as two extracted factors support this claim.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
For the last three decades, the characteristic of ownership has been at the centre of economic debates and 
polices all over the World.  From a theoretical perspective, trouble related to inducement and contracting 
leads to inefficiencies as a result of public ownership. This is due to managers of state-owned enterprises 
pursuing aims which differ from those of private firms (political view) and due to such managers facing 
less observation (management view). The budget constraints faced by the managers are softened, and 
their objectives are subsequently distorted. Soft-budget constraints result from bankruptcy not being a 
probable threat to public managers, as it is in the interest of the central government to bail them out in 
case of financial distress.  However, this paper investigates the evolution of selected measures, and relays 
that evolution with privatisation – summoning established theoretical principles, particularly those 
Table 10 2000 
Variables Component 1   (Size) Component 2 (Perf) 
Turnover 0.934 -0.041 
Profit 0.780 0.080 
Total Assets 0.942 -0.004 
Number of Employees 0.835 -0.169 
Ownership -0.013 -0.441 
Prod 0.007 0.811 
Prof 0.137 0.797 
Variance Extracted 44.062 21.766 
134 
 
concerned with establishing a connection between ownership and performance. As previously 
mentioned, the evaluation of privatisation programs includes efficiency as well as equity issues. This 
paper argues that the distributive effects of privatisation policies require further research efforts and 
focus, particularly at the empirical level.  
 
Factor analysis is used to assess the role of ownership with respect to enterprise performances. It is a 
method for investigating whether a number of variables of interest are linearly related to a smaller 
number of non-observable factors. The parameters of these linear functions are referred to as loadings. 
Under certain conditions, the theoretical variance of each variable and the co-variance of each pair of 
variables are expressed in terms of the loadings and the variance of the error terms. The communality of 
a variable is the part of its variance that is explained by common factors, whereas, it’s specific variance is 
the part of the variance of the variable that is not accounted for by common factors. The whole approach 
usually develops in two stages. In the first stage, one set of loadings is calculated and yields theoretical 
variances and co-variances that fit the observed ones as closely as possible according to a certain 
criterion. These loadings, however, may not agree with prior expectations, or may not lend themselves to 
reasonable interpretation. Thus, in the second stage, the first loadings are “rotated" in an effort to arrive 
at another set of loadings that fit equally well to the observed variances and co-variances, but are more 
consistent with prior expectations or more easily interpreted. 
 
The principal component method is used to determine the first set of loadings. This method tries to find 
values in the loadings that bring the estimates of total communality as close as possible to the total of 
observed variances. Because the variables are not measured in the same units, it is better to standardize 
them prior to subjecting them to the principal component method. All variables should have a mean equal 
to zero and variance equal to one. The varimax rotation method permits the detection of factors related to 
a select number of variables. It discourages the detection of factors influencing all variables. The number 
of state and mixed-owned enterprises has been dramatically reduced in Finland since the 1980s.  This 
may attribute to different schools of thought advocating the superiority of the private sector over that of 
the public sector. In order to compare the performance of state, mixed and private companies, in this 
study data on turnover, profit, total assets, the number of employees, ownership, productivity (PROD) 
and profitability (PROF) was collected, and factor analysis was used for the years 1998 and 2000.  Sample 
sizes were restricted by the availability of data on state-owned companies; the more data available on 
state-owned companies, the larger the size of the sample.  Using factor analysis, two primary components 
were extracted from data pertaining to the year 1998 and the year 2000. These factors consisted of the 
characteristics of size and performance but not ownership.  Such findings demonstrate that corporate 
performance is a function of two separate characteristics, and those variables representing size and 
performances are correlated in separate factors.   
 
Ownership is a unique characteristic and does not share common traits with either size or performance. 
Such findings undermine theories in favour of ownership as an integral part of corporate performance. As 
a result of this study, it can be concluded that ownership is not correlated to variables such as size and 
performance. Moreover, it is not an influential aspect of corporate performance, because it takes up a 
smaller area of common variance shared by all involved variables. Thus ownership seems not to be a 
significant matter for the performance of an enterprise. Privatization, which brings with it private owners 
presumed to place greater emphasis on profit goals and carry out new investments that increase output 
and employment. Efficiency supposed to be improved as a result and profitability follows. These 
improvements can be attributed to the prevailing market structure or the terms of share issue 
privatizations. The study’s results suggest that privatisation in Finland has not led to such an 
improvement as expected.  
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